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A FRAME-BASED ANALYSIS OF SYNAESTHETIC
METAPHORS
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to use a frame-based ac-
count to explain some empirical findings regarding the accessibil-
ity of synaesthetic metaphors. Therefore, some results of empir-
ical studies will be discussed with regard to the question of how
much it matters whether the concept of the source domain in a
synaesthetic metaphor is a scalar or a quality concept. Further-
more, typed frames are introduced, and it is explained how the
notion of a minimal upper attribute can be used in the analysis
of adjective-noun compounds. Finally, frames are used to analyze
synaesthetic metaphors; it turns out that they offer an adequate
basis for the explanation of different accessibility rates found in
empirical studies.
1. INTRODUCTION
For our concept of synaesthetic metaphors, we follow prominent theo-
ries of metaphor which state that a metaphor is a mapping of a concept
from some source domain onto a concept of some target domain, where
the target and source domains are not identical (Black 1962; Lakoff and
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Johnson 1980). For illustration, in the metaphorical sentence (1) a con-
cept from the source domain of bodily motion (expressed by the verb
‘bow’) is mapped onto a concept from a geographical target domain
(expressed by the noun ‘road’).
(1) The road bows down into the valley.
The characteristic of synaesthetic metaphors is that their concepts are
taken from domains involving sensory perception. For example, in the
metaphor silent color the source domain concept silent is mapped onto
the target domain concept color. The two concepts belong to different
perceptual domains; the first centered around the sense modality sound
and the second around the sense modality vision.
In this paper, we are specifically concerned with synaesthetic me-
taphors and thus will not be discussing synaesthesia in a neurological
sense. We restrict ourselves to synaesthetic metaphors where the tar-
get and source domain concepts are taken from the perceptual domains
of vision, taste, touch, smell and sound.1 Furthermore, we only discuss
metaphors expressed by adjective-noun compounds.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 dis-
cusses some results of empirical studies with regard to the adequacy of
directionality theses and with regard to how much it matters whether
the source domain concept in a synaesthetic metaphor is a scalar or a
quality concept. Sect. 3 introduces typed frames and explains how the
notion of a minimal upper attribute can be used in the analysis of non-
metaphorical adjective-noun compounds and synaesthetic metaphors.
2. SYNAESTHETIC METAPHORS
2.1. Directionality theses based on analyses of lyric corpora
One of the first systematic studies of synaesthetic metaphors has to do
with the directionality of mapping. Ullmann (1967) claims that con-
cepts of so-called lower senses (on the left of the hierarchy shown in
Fig. 1) should be more likely to occur in the source domain of synaes-
thetic metaphors, while concepts of higher senses (on the right side of
the hierarchy) should be more likely to occur in the target domain. His
thesis of directionality entails that a metaphor with a concept from a
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Figure 1: Directionality and the hierarchy of the senses according to Ullmann (1967).
source domain lower in the hierarchy of sense modalities than the con-
cept of the target domain should tend to occur more frequently in use
than a metaphor with the reverse direction of domains. For example,
a metaphor like cold redness (a mapping of touch onto color) is in line
with the postulated hierarchy and therefore should be preferred to red
coldness (a mapping of color onto touch), which contradicts the hierar-
chy. To establish his claim Ullmann analyzes examples from lyric poetry
like the following one:
Soft music like a perfume, and a sweet light
Golden with audible odours exquisite
Swathe me with cerements for eternity.
(Arthur Symons, “The Opium-Smoker”, cit. after Ullmann
1967:275)
Subsequent directionality claims concerning the mapping of synaes-
thetic metaphors are more differentiated and complex (Williams 1976;
Shen 1997; Yu 2003). Williams (1976), for example, proposes a non-
linear hierarchy of sense modalities. Common to all the mentioned
studies is that they are based on the analysis of lyric poetry. Hence
the proposed directionality theses were constructed by counting the
frequency of occurrences of different synaesthetic metaphors in lyric
poetry.
It seems reasonable to postulate that if any version of the direc-
tionality thesis is empirically adequate for a certain language, then the
choice of source and target domains should significantly influence the
cognitive accessibility of a synaesthetic metaphor. Hence one can expect
to find such constraints in non-poetic uses of language as well.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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2.2. A directionality thesis based on emprical studies
In Werning et al. (2006) we empirically tested the directionality claims
that have been made in the literature. German-speaking participants
were asked to judge whether a certain synaesthetic metaphor was intu-
itively accessible or not. For that purpose, we constructed 57 random
synaesthetic metaphors in the form of adjective-noun compounds. The
adjectives represented the source domain concepts, while the nouns
represented the target domain concepts.2 Care was taken to ensure that
for each metaphor with a certain succession of source and target do-
main (e.g., cold smell) the complementary metaphor (smelling coldness)
was tested as well. The idea behind concentrating on adjective-noun
compounds was that they would constitute the simplest possible meta-
phors and so not induce reference to a relevant context of some sort.
It was very important to rule out the possibility that contextual fac-
tors would influence the accessibility of the metaphors under considera-
tion. The adjective-noun compounds presented to the test subjects were
not preselected with respect to their interpretability and thus expressed
only potentially understandable synaesthetic metaphors. In the follow-
ing we use the term ‘synaesthetic metaphor’ for any expression which is
built according to our definition, whether or not it is interpretable.
Our results suggest that three independent factors seem to influence
the cognitive accessibility of synaesthetic metaphors: the frequency of
the metaphor’s head (all word frequencies were taken from the German
version of the CELEX corpus Baayen et al. 1995, which consists of about
six million items), the morphological derivation of the adjectival mod-
ifier and the directionality of the mapping. The more frequent the me-
taphor’s head is in the language, the more accessible the metaphor. Ad-
ditionally, the accessibility of the metaphor decreases if the modifier is
morphologically derived from a verb or a noun. These two factors might
affect all interpretations of metaphorical or even non-metaphorical ex-
pressions, but the influence of directionality seems to occur specifically
in the case of synaesthetic metaphors. Fig. 2 shows the results of our
analysis with respect to directionality. (The factors of word frequency
and morphological complexity were carefully ruled out in the study in
order to focus squarely on directionality.)
Our results do suggest support for the thesis that the accessibility
of a synaesthetic metaphor does depend on the direction of the map-
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(a) Significant influences of direc-
tionality on accessibility. Shown are
all directionalities which indicate a
significant influence on accessibil-
ity.
(b) Directionality hierarchy. Solid
arrows show directions significantly
rated as ‘accessible’, while dot-
ted arrows represent neither signifi-
cantly impeded nor enhanced direc-
tions. A missing arrow indicates a
direction significantly rated as ‘in-
accessible’.
Figure 2: Identified influences of directionality and the resulting directionality hierarchy
according to empirical data by Werning et al. (2006).
ping from source to target domain concepts, and on which source and
target domains (vision, hearing, taste, etc.) are involved in the meta-
phor. In Fig. 2(a) the deviations from the null hypothesis, that there is
no directionality effect, are shown. Based on these accessibility results
the directionality hierarchy in Fig. 2(b) was constructed. The hierarchy
in Fig. 2(b) is a graphical illustration of our directionality claim, while
Fig. 2(a) presents the results of the empirical investigation, on which
the directionality thesis is based.3 We are aware that this directionality
claim does not hold for every metaphor. Insofar as it expresses only
statistical tendencies, deviations are to be expected. However, there
were some cases of striking differences in accessibility that might be
problematic for our directionality thesis. These cases could not be ex-
plained in terms of frequency, derivation or directionality. For example:
there are differences in subjects’ judgments regarding the following two
metaphors, which both map a visual concept onto an auditory concept:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(2) gelbe Ruhe (‘yellow silence’)
(3) blasser Klang (‘pale sound’)
All subjects assessed the first metaphor (2) as ‘not accessible’, but for
93% the second metaphor (3) was accessible, despite the fact that the
modifiers are both not morphologically derived, and that the metaphors
share the same directionality (color onto sound). Moreover, the fre-
quency of the adjective ‘gelb’ (203) exceeds the frequency of the adjec-
tive ‘blass’ (101).
One has to ask, how can the mentioned findings be explained, and
especially, how do these two metaphors differ? There is a basic differ-
ence between the concept types yellow and pale. Pale is a scalar con-
cept, while yellow is a quality concept. Scalar concepts not only form
antonym pairs (e.g. pale and colorful, hot and cold), they also need a
contextually fixed norm for their interpretation. Quality concepts like
color terms, by contrast, do not form antonym pairs, but instead form
an incompatible set. This means that, for example, red can not be seen
as the opposite of blue and blue can not be seen as the opposite of green.
The following sentences mentioned by Lehrer and Lehrer (1982:495)
illustrate this difference between scalar and quality concepts:
(4) If the coffee is cool and the tea is lukewarm, which one is
warmer?
(5) If Jane’s dress is orange and Mary’s dress is yellow, whose dress
is more purple?
According to Lehrer and Lehrer (1982), answering the first question
should be easy; surely the tea is warmer than the coffee. But what about
the second sentence? Which dress is more purple? It is possible to say:
‘orange is more purple-like then yellow’, but this does not indicate that
orange and yellow lie on a purple-scale.
As a consequence of the differences between the two concept types,
the comparative forms of scalar adjectives and quality adjectives are
interpreted in different ways.
(6) This color is brighter than that color.
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A sentence like (6) means that the first color occupies a higher place
on the brightness scale than the second color. The use of a comparative
form of a color concept, by contrast, has a rather different interpreta-
tion.
(7) This color is more red than that color.
Sentence (7) means that there is a focal red and that one of the colors
is more similar to this focal red then the other color. Lehrer and Lehrer
(1982:495) state: “[. . . ] the scalability of color terms, as exhibited by
phrases such as very red, fairly red, A is more red than B indicates not a
single dimensional color scale, but rather the existence of a focal point
for each color”. Thus, comparative forms are interpreted differently de-
pending on the type of concept they are applied to. Thus, the distinction
between these concept types is linguistically motivated.
In order to test the influence of these concept types on the accessi-
bility of synaesthetic metaphors, we did a second study (Beseoglu and
Fleischhauer 2007) and created a new random set of synaesthetic me-
taphors. This time, the source domain was restricted to quality and
scalar concepts from the domain of vision. All these concepts were
combined with three different heads: Geräusch ‘sound’, Geruch ‘smell’
and Geschmack ‘taste’.4 By restricting ourselves to these three nouns we
ruled out another factor potentially influencing our data: concepts like
taste and sweet differ fundamentally in that the first one denotes an at-
tribute and the second a value of that attribute (cf. Sect. 3.1). Note that
we did not use touch as a target domain concept because the German
analogue Gefühl is ambigously used. The metaphors were judged with
respect to their intuitive accessibility by 85 German-speaking partici-
pants. In addition to accessibility, the same variables as in the the first
study were analyzed. Neither the frequency of the target and source do-
main concepts nor the morphological derivation of the adjectives used
in the source domain showed any effect on metaphor accessibility. Thus,
it remains unclear whether these factors have any influence on the ac-
cessibility of synaesthetic metaphors. Concept type was the only vari-
able which had an effect in our study.
The null hypothesis was again that there would be no directionality
effects on the accessibility of synaesthetic metaphors, thus an equipar-
tition was expected. We used the value +1 for ‘accessible’ and -1 for
www.thebalticyearbook.org







N 209 212 216







N 214 211 208
mean value -0.07 0.15 0.43
Table 1: Comparison of metaphors with quality and scalar concept types as source
domain concept.
‘not accessible’, so that a mean value of 0 would indicate the null hy-
pothesis. A t-test was used to calculate significant deviations (p < 0.05)
from the expected mean value. The results are shown in Table 1. Highly
significant results are marked with ‘**’ (p < 0.01).
The data in Table 1 show a clear difference between the accessi-
bility of metaphors involving quality concepts and those using scalar
concepts. All directions with quality concepts in the source domain were
significantly impeded. On the other hand, when scalar concepts were
used in the source domain they exhibited no significant inhibition of
accessibility. We even observed a significant enhancement in the case of
mapping a scalar concept onto sound.
Given this data, it seems reasonable to divide the concepts associ-
ated with sense modalities into two different classes (scalar and qual-
ity), both for linguistic reasons and in view of the empirical results. The
differentiation shown by our study indicates a further variable influenc-
ing the accessibility of synaesthetic metaphors, namely concept type.5
To sum up, in the second study metaphors like bright sound or
gloomy smell appeared to be ‘accessible’, while metaphors like red sound
or black smell appeared to be ‘inaccessible’. Now the question arises:
how can this dependency of accessibility on the concept types involved
in metaphors be explained?
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3. A FRAME-BASED ANALYSIS OF SYNAESTHETIC METAPHORS
The empirical findings from the preceding section show that metaphors
like bright sound or gloomy smell were judged ‘accessible’ by our test
subjects, while metaphors like red sound or black smell were judged ‘in-
accessible’. In this section, we will present a theoretical approach which
could explain why a metaphor’s accessibility depends on the concept
type of its modifier (i.e., the adjective). For that purpose, we will first
give a short introduction to our notion of frames, which is based on Pe-
tersen (2007). We will then explain how we analyze non-metaphorical
adjective-noun compounds using frames. Finally, we will give a sketch
of how our analysis of non-metaphorical adjective-noun compounds can
be applied to the analysis of synaesthetic metaphors and how that could
explain the observed differences regarding the accessibility judgements.
3.1. Introduction to frames
According to Barsalou (1992:21), frames, understood as recursive at-
tribute-value structures, “provide the fundamental representation of
knowledge in human cognition”. We assume that a concept frame con-
sists of a set of attribute-value pairs, where each attribute specifies a
property by which the described concept is characterized. Since at-
tributes specify properties of very different kinds, one could establish
an attribute classification with classes like role attributes (e.g., DRIVER
of a car, TEACHER of a class, MOTHER of a person), attributive attributes
(e.g., COLOR, LENGTH, TASTE of an object), part-of attributes (e.g., ENGINE
of a car, HEAD of a person), and so forth (cf. Guarino 1992).6 However,
such a classification is of no interest for the present study. The only
claim concerning attributes which we will assume here is that attributes
in frames assign unique values to concepts and are thus functional rela-
tions. As an example, Fig. 3 shows a frame for a car drawn in its graph
representation,7 where arcs are labeled by attributes and nodes by types
(the latter are introduced in the remainder of this section).
Values assigned to attributes are frames themselves and determine
the concrete realization of the property given by the attribute. That
is, assigning the value red to the attribute COLOR in a car frame means
that a car represented by the frame is red. Such values may be either
complex or atomic. Atomic values are not structured internally. Exam-
www.thebalticyearbook.org















Figure 3: An exemplary car frame in graph representation.
ples of atomic values in Fig. 3 are 4-cylinder as a value for CYLINDER or
diesel as a value for FUEL. By contrast, complex values are themselves
represented by frames, meaning that the value is further specified by
attributes of its own. For example, our car frame contains an attribute
ENGINE, whose value is further specified by attributes like DISPLACEMENT,
CYLINDER or FUEL. Moreover, attribute values may be rather unspecific,
as can be seen with the attributes COLOR, MILEAGE, DISPLACEMENT in the
example frame. The recursive structure of frames enables them to rep-
resent concepts at many different levels of detail.
Unfortunately, the frame representation as described above imposes
no formal restrictions on the values which can be assigned to an at-
tribute. This can lead to such undesirable frames as [SHAPE: red] or
[INTENSITY: round], where neither red nor round are generally consid-
ered as appropriate values for their respective attributes. We therefore
need some means to restrict the set of admissible frames. One solution
to this problem, which is common in Computational Linguistics (cf. Car-
penter 1992), is to assign types to frames and to order these types in a
type signature with respect to their specificity (e.g., apple is a subtype of
fruit, which is itself a subtype of object). An exemplary type signature
is shown in Fig. 4. The type signature is enriched with appropriateness
conditions (ACs), e.g., <COLOR:color> is an AC for the type object. ACs
fulfill two tasks: First, they restrict the set of adequate attributes for
frames of a certain type (e.g., frames of type object may carry the at-
tributes COLOR and SHAPE, but not TASTE). Second, ACs specify the range
of appropriate values for each attribute by requiring all values of an at-
tribute to be of at least a certain type. Hence if the type fruit carries
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech


















Figure 4: Example type signature
the AC <TASTE: taste>, this means that the attribute TASTE in a frame
of type fruit may take only values of type taste or of a subtype of taste
(e.g., sour, sweet, ...). Note that it is possible to assign to attributes
underspecified values like taste instead of concrete values like sweet.
In order to capture the ontological status of attributes we follow the
arguments given in Guarino (1992) and postulate that in a type sig-
nature, any attribute must also occur as a type, i.e., the attribute set
is a subset of the type set (for details see Petersen 2007). As a conse-
quence, an expression such as “taste” can have two different meanings:
if it is written as "taste", it refers to the type taste, and if it is writ-
ten as "TASTE", it refers to the attribute TASTE. For every attribute ATTR
the type signature contains an introductory type which carries the AC
<ATTR: attr>. Subtypes inherit all ACs from their supertypes, but may
also tighten them up, so that more specific values are prescribed for the
attribute given. E.g., supposing that all apples are round and are rep-
resented by frames of type apple, we could tighten up the AC <SHAPE:
shape> at type object to <SHAPE: round> at type apple. Since our type
signatures are monotonic inheritance hierarchies, loosening of ACs is
(at least in the standard approach) not allowed. It is important to note
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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that we require our frames to be well-typed, by which we mean that all
attributes occurring in a frame have to be declared appropriate in the
ACs.
It is common to use natural language expressions as type labels in
order to improve readability and to intuitively indicate the intended se-
mantics of the types. However, one should keep in mind that a type sig-
nature usually orders types of very different semantic categories: that
is, they correspond to all kinds of attributes (see discussion above), to
attributions like red or long, to sortal concepts like apple, and so forth.
Hence the subtype relation cannot be interpreted in a uniform way.8 For
example, the relation between color and red is different from the rela-
tion between fruit and apple: the former relates an attributive attribute
to a possible value or attribution, the latter relates a category to a sub-
category.
3.2. Frames for adjective-noun compounds
Before we can approach synaesthetic metaphors in terms of frames,
we need to introduce our frame-based analysis of adjective-noun com-
pounds, since all metaphors from Sect. 2 are in that form.9 Therefore,
we consider the following two example phrases:
(8) red apple
(9) sweet apple
Obviously, the composition of red and apple yields a frame with the
value of COLOR being red, while the composition of sweet and apple















Both frames differ from the general apple frame
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only with respect to the value of a single attribute.10 Hence the semantic
contribution of the adjective to the compound is twofold: (1) it selects
an attribute and (2) it modifies the attribute value.
The corresponding type signature in Fig. 4 reveals an interesting
relationship between the selected attribute and the inserted value. The
adjective corresponds to a type which is a subtype of the attribute type.
This is not an accidental, but rather a systematic relationship following
from our definition of type signatures. First of all, we claim that each
attribute ATTR is introduced into the type signature by an AC of the form
<ATTR: attr> at some type Intro(ATTR), which means that only frames
of a subtype of attr are appropriate values for ATTR. Secondly, we say
that ACs are monotonically inherited by subtypes (cf. Sect. 3.1) and
that subtypes may not loosen inherited ACs, but only tighten them up.
This guarantees that any appropriate value val of an attribute ATTR has
to be a subtype of attr. In such a case we say that the attribute ATTR is
an upper attribute (UA) of the type val. If ATTR is minimal in the sense
that it is the most specific upper attribute of val, then ATTR is said to
be the minimal upper attribute (MUA) of val (cf. Petersen 2007). E.g.,
the MUA of red in Fig. 4 would be COLOR since color is the minimal
supertype of red which is also used as an attribute in some AC (i.e.,
<COLOR: color> at type object).
Coming back to the problem of adjective-noun compounds, we as-
sume that in general the attribute selected by the adjective is the MUA
of the type it corresponds to. For our discussion here it does not mat-
ter whether one supposes that adjectives constitute their own semantic





















Figure 5: Type signature for examples (10) and (11)
with an open possessor argument. The possessor argument has only
one attribute, namely being the dimension along which the adjective
predicates. This dimension is the MUA of the attribute’s value.11
3.3. Using frames to model synaesthetic metaphors
In what follows, we will concentrate on a frame-based analysis of synaes-
thetic metaphors. We claim that, in principle, our language process-
ing system can process simple metaphorical expressions in pretty much
the same way as non-metaphorical ones, as long as they come in the
form of adjective-noun compounds. Our analysis from the preceding
section should therefore also account for the metaphors from Sect. 2.
As discussed there, the accessibility of synaesthetic metaphors heavily
depends on whether the modifying adjective is a quality concept or a
scalar concept. We use the following examples to illustrate our analysis
of synaesthetic metaphors using frames:
(10) quiet smell
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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(11) red smell
Along with these examples we assume a type signature containing
(among other types) a type intensity which introduces an intensity scale
into the type signature (see Fig. 5). The type intensity is a supertype
of both smell intensity and sound intensity. The former one is a scale
of smell intensities, containing the antonyms mild and strong as its ex-
tremes. The latter one is a scale of sound intensities, containing quiet
and loud as its extremes. Since we only use intensity, but not smell
intensity or sound intensity, as an attribute, the MUA of all four types
is INTENSITY. The types smell intensity and sound intensity fulfill two
tasks: first, each establishes its own particular specification of the inten-
sity scale and second, they are referred to in the ACs at the types sound
and smell in order to adequately restrict the values of the attribute IN-
TENSITY with respect to the frame node to which INTENSITY is attached.
Hence in frames of type smell the value of INTENSITY is restricted to sub-
types of smell intensity, while in frames of type sound it is restricted to
subtypes of sound intensity.
Although it seems like an arbitrary choice to assume that neither
smell intensity nor sound intensity are used as attributes, we think that
there are good reasons to do so. Imagine a dog pile with a very intense
smell: a frame for such a concept certainly has an attribute SMELL whose
value is a frame of type smell. Inside such a smell frame, an attribute
INTENSITY makes more sense than an attribute SMELL INTENSITY since the
context is already restricted to attributes pertaining to smell. As another
example, consider a frame for the concept of a personal computer. Of
course one would say that a computer has a volume (i.e., a sound in-
tensity), but it is not the volume of the computer itself, but rather the
intensity of the sound of its fans, so there would be an attribute FAN,
which itself has a value with an attribute SOUND, which again has a
value with an attribute INTENSITY. One can still introduce some kind of
shortcut attribute named VOLUME in the personal computer frame whose
value refers to the value of the attribute INTENSITY in the sound frame.
According to our analysis of adjective-noun compounds, (10) would
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But according to the type signature in Fig. 5, the possible values for
INTENSITY in a smell frame must be subtypes of smell intensity. The type
quiet, however, is no subtype of smell intensity and the frame is thus
invalid. In order to explain why this metaphor is grasped anyway, we
assume that the invalid frame is reinterpreted by drawing an analogy
from quiet to mild:
smell mild ∼ quiet
INTENSITY
Since both quiet and mild belong to the lower section of their respec-
tive scales, since these scales are both specifications of the scale which
is introduced at type intensity, and since quiet and mild are linked by
sharing the same MUA INTENSITY, it seems reasonable to draw an anal-
ogy between quiet and mild. So basically, the metaphorical expression
quiet smell is analyzed like the non-metaphorical expression red apple.
The only difference is that the resulting frame of the first expression
needs an extra reinterpretation step in order to make it valid with re-
spect to the ACs.
In contrast to (10), example (11) red smell fails to be interpretable.
This follows from the fact that the MUA of red is COLOR, which is not an







A reinterpretation of an attribute value is only possible if the attribute
is licensed by the ACs. In the example phrase red smell, the attribute
COLOR is not licensed by the ACs of type smell, so the frame must be
invalid, regardless of the value assigned to COLOR. The ability to rein-
terpret quiet smell results from the fact that the MUA of quiet already
is an attribute of the smell frame and that an analogy can be drawn
between quiet and mild (indicated by the dotted line in Fig. 5).
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4. CONCLUSION
In the previous section we presented our analysis of synaesthetic meta-
phors using frames. We applied a technique originally developed for the
analysis of non-metaphorical adjective-noun compounds to the analysis
of metaphorical adjective-noun compounds and discovered that there
are (at least) two kinds of frames resulting from this approach: (1)
frames bearing inadequate attributes and (2) frames having inappropri-
ate values for certain (adequate) attributes. Metaphors corresponding
to frames of type (1) seem to be uninterpretable, while metaphors of
type (2) can be comprehended as long as it is possible to reinterpret
the inappropriate value as an appropriate value. This reinterpretation
depends on whether the two values share a common MUA and lie on
the same phase of a scale. Hence our frame approach models the em-
pirical findings presented in Sect. 2 by stating that synaesthetic meta-
phors with scalar concepts as modifiers are more likely to be accessible
than synaesthetic metaphors with quality concepts in the modifier po-
sition. These findings cannot be explained in terms of directionality of
metaphorical mapping.
We are aware that our frame-based analysis of synaesthetic meta-
phors presented in the preceding section depends on several modeling
decisions. For example, the MUA of a type may change, whenever the
order of the types in the type hierarchy is changed. However, seeing red
as a special kind of color and thus modeling red as a subtype of color
seems very plausible to us. Also the decision to stipulate that sound
intensity and smell intensity are special kinds of intensity is reasonable.
Furthermore, the analysis depends on the hypothesis that an inappro-
priate value may be reinterpreted by an appropriate value if both are
connected by a shared MUA and if they bear an analogy to each other,
while an inadequate attribute has to be rejected and can thus never en-
ter a frame. This hypothesis seems reasonable, too, since grasping an
inadequate attribute cognitively involves more than drawing a simple
analogy.
As discussed in the preceding section, the frame-based approach
to the analysis of adjective-noun compounds provides an explanatory
approach to the fact that a synaesthetic metaphor with a scalar adjec-
tive like quiet smell is predominantly judged accessible (Werning et al.
2006:2370) in spite of violating the directionality hierarchy. Remember
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that the metaphor quiet smell is a mapping of sound onto smell, which is
significantly impeded according to the mentioned directionality studies.
Hence the scalar vs. qualitative distinction is more crucial for the acces-
sibility of synaesthetic metaphors than the directionality hierarchy. The
empirical results concerning this distinction are reflected by the frame-
based analysis and the described step of reinterpretation since quality
and scalar concepts differ with regard to the MUA of their respective
types.
However, we are aware of the fact that some empirical findings,
even in our own data, contradict our hypotheses. For example, the me-
taphor dark smell was judged nearly inaccessible (Beseoglu and Fleis-
chhauer 2007:714), while an expression like red sweet shows higher ac-
cessibility results than our account predicts. We expect that red sweet is
not analyzed by simply reinterpreting attribute values of a sweet frame.
Instead, while processing red sweet, a more complex fruit frame is con-
structed which states that red fruits are more likely to taste sweet than
green ones. A formal frame-based account for approaching such more
general metaphors still needs to be developed. Also, more empirical
research has to be done in order to test our hypotheses.
Petersen and Werning (2007) discusses the cognitive adequacy of
the frame model for the decomposition of concepts. It has been shown
that by applying the paradigm of object-related neural synchroniza-
tion, a biologically motivated model for the cortical implementation of
frames can be developed. The present study confirms once more our
confidence in the frame approach by showing that the presented em-
pirical data can be directly explained in our model. Hence we follow
Barsalou in his statement, cited above, that frames provide the funda-
mental representation of knowledge in human cognition.
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Notes
1We do not consider emotions to be perceptual concepts and thus exclude them from
our analysis.
2The source and target domain concepts that were used are listed in Appendix A.
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
19 Wiebke Petersen, Jens Fleischhauer, Hakan Beseoglu, Peter Bücker
3For details see Werning et al. (2006).
4The source and target domain concepts that were used are listed in Appendix B.
5In a yet unpublished study, Beseoglu, Kiguradze, and Fleischhauer acquired the same
results regarding Georgian speakers and Georgian metaphors. It is also the case in Geor-
gian that scalar concepts appear to be better modifiers than quality concepts.
6In this paper, attributes are written in small capitals and types are written in a san-
s-serif font.
7Apart from the graph representation, we also use a matrix representation, which is
more suited for embedding frames in text. In this form, a frame is embraced in square
brackets and contains a list of attribute-value pairs in the form ‘ATTRIBUTE: value’, where
each value may again be a frame embraced in square brackets.
8For a comprehensive discussion of these problems consult the literature on formal
ontologies (cf. Guarino 1992; Guarino and Welty 2000).
9The analysis given here is taken from a simple frame-based language processing sys-
tem which aims at the translation of natural-language expressions to frames on a best-ef-
fort basis.
10To simplify matters, we use greatly reduced frames which only contain a small
fraction of the concept’s content, especially leaving out all syntactic information. In a
frame-based language processing system, the frames shown here would occur as sub-
frames of larger frames representing language signs as a whole and containing, besides
the semantic content, also syntactic information. Modeling such frames would go beyond
the scope of this paper.
11Note that in most frame-based language processing systems, frames with empty ar-
gument nodes cannot be expressed.
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B. Used adjectives and nouns from Beseoglu and Fleischhauer (2007)
B.1. List of adjectives used
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